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# CENTRAL

## INTELLIGENCE

### BULLETIN



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### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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	resumed withdrawals seems move to pressure	
	New Delhi into acceptance of Colombo proposals	
	for talks. (Page 6)	_

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border."

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No withdrawals have been noted since the end of December. Peiping's present move seems timed to increase pressure on New Delhi to agree to the Colombo conference proposals during Ceylonese Prime Minister Bandaranaike's current visit to India. The Chinese claim their new pull-backs will place their military forces behind "the line of actual control of November 1959," the line they have proposed as a basis for a continuing cease-fire.

(Indian Foreign Secretary Desai told Ambassador Galbraith on 11 January that the proposals brought from Peiping by Mrs. Bandaranaike reflected no change in the Chinese position. Peiping had not gone beyond its own proposals of 30 December, which Nehru rejected on 1 January. Desai said the Chinese "positive response" to the Colombo conference proposals represented merely a willingness to use them as a basis for starting talks, which the Indians would not accept.

Mrs. Bandaranaike's discussions in New Delhi were carried over an extra day. This suggests that the Indians are trying to avoid a flat rejection by offering some form of counterproposal.

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTE

Haiti:

President Duvalier may soon resign and leave the country.

the deteriorating financial situation, growing dissatisfaction within the government, and Duvalier's poor state of health might impel such a decision.

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### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

### The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

### The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

### The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

### The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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